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Aboriginal Rights, Resource 
Development, and the Source of the 
Provincial Duty to Consult in  
Haida Nation and Taku River 
Kent McNeil 
The main issues dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 
decisions in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)
1
 
and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project As-
sessment Director)
2
 were the nature and scope of the provincial Crown’s 
duty to consult with First Nations and accommodate their interests be-
fore authorizing resource development on lands subject to unestablished 
Aboriginal title claims. Those issues will not, however, be the focus of 
this article. Instead, I am going to discuss what, in my opinion, is a 
major preliminary issue lying largely hidden in both cases, namely the 
source and extent of provincial jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title 
for the purposes of resource development. In Haida Nation and Taku 
River, the Court assumed that British Columbia has authority to infringe 
Aboriginal title in appropriate circumstances for the purposes of forestry 
and mining, thereby triggering a duty to consult with the Aboriginal 
nations concerned. However, although logically that provincial authority 
to infringe must be present before the duty to consult can arise in these 
circumstances, its source was not explained or even identified. 
A good starting point for discussion of this issue is an argument 
made by British Columbia in Haida Nation that was dismissed by the 
Supreme Court. The province contended that only the federal govern-
ment has a duty to consult with First Nations in relation to resource 
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2
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74 [hereinafter “Taku River”]. 
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development because section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
3
 pro-
vides that “[a]ll Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the 
several Provinces of Canada … at the Union … shall belong to the sev-
eral Provinces,” and that this provision conferred on British Columbia 
the exclusive right to use the lands in question. The Province then ar-
gued that this right “cannot be limited by the protection for Aboriginal 
rights found in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” because this “would 
‘undermine the balance of federalism’.”4 Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
response was succinct and unqualified: 
The answer to this argument is that the Provinces took their interest in 
land subject to “any Interest other than that of the Province in the 
same” [s.109]. The duty to consult and accommodate here at issue is 
grounded in the assertion of Crown sovereignty which pre-dated the 
Union. It follows that the Province took the lands subject to this duty. 
It cannot therefore claim that s.35 deprived it of powers it would 
otherwise have enjoyed. As stated in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber 
Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.), lands in the Province are 
“available to [the Province] as a source of revenue whenever the estate 
of the Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title” (p.59). The 
Crown’s argument on this point has been canvassed by this Court in 
Delgamuukw [infra, note 7], at para. 175, where Lamer C.J. reiterated 
the conclusions in St. Catherine’s Milling, [infra, note 6]. There is 
therefore no foundation to the Province’s argument on this point.
5
 
While McLachlin C.J.’s point that the duty to consult and accommodate 
is grounded in Crown assertion of sovereignty and therefore pre-dated 
Confederation is important, it will not be pursued here. Nor will I dis-
cuss the connection she drew between this duty and Aboriginal interests 
in section 109 lands. Instead, my focus will be on her reliance on St. 
Catherine’s Milling and Delgamuukw, and the light those decisions may 
shed on the source of provincial authority to infringe Aboriginal land 
rights. 
As stated by McLachlin C.J., in St. Catherine’s Milling the Privy 
Council decided that section 109 gave the provinces a beneficial interest 
in lands subject to Aboriginal or Indian title, “available to them as a 
                                                                                                                                
3
  30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
4
  Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 58, quoting from the Crown’s factum, at para. 96. 
5
  Id., at para. 59. 
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source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is disencumbered of 
the Indian title.”6 A necessary implication of this is that the provinces’ 
beneficial interest is not available to them until the land is disencum-
bered of the Aboriginal title. This is because, given the Privy Council’s 
decision that Aboriginal title is an “Interest other than that of the Prov-
ince” within the meaning of section 109,7 the provinces’ proprietary 
interest is limited by a pre-existing proprietary interest. Moreover, be-
cause section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the Parliament 
of Canada exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for 
the Indians,” the provinces have no authority to remove the encum-
brance of Aboriginal title by extinguishing it themselves.
8
 For constitu-
tional reasons that predate the enactment of section 35 in 1982, the 
provinces’ entitlement to natural resources on Aboriginal title lands 
depends on removal of that encumbrance by the federal government.
9
 
In St. Catherine’s Milling, the Privy Council declined to define Ab-
original title, beyond describing it as “a personal and usufructuary 
right,”10 a description that Judson J. in Calder v. British Columbia (At-
torney General) regarded as unhelpful in explaining what Aboriginal 
title means.
11
 Not until the Delgamuukw decision in 1997 did the Su-
preme Court provide us with a clear definition of Aboriginal title as “the 
right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that 
title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aborig-
                                                                                                                                
6
  St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46, at 59 
[hereinafter “St. Catherine’s Milling”]. 
7
  Id., at 58; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010, at para. 175 [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
8
  This conclusion, which was at least implicit in St. Catherine’s Milling, supra, note 6, 
was explicitly affirmed in Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 172-81. See also Paul v. British 
Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 28 
[hereinafter “Paul”]. 
9
  See Hamar Foster, “Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: Is 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia ‘Invented Law’?” (1998) 56:2 The Advocate 221. Prior to the 
enactment of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, extinguishment could have been accomplished by 
clear and plain federal legislation as well as by treaty, but due to s. 35, unilateral legislative extin-
guishment of Aboriginal rights is no longer possible: R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 28 (Lamer C.J.) [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]; Mitchell v. Canada 
(Minister of National Revenue), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 11 (McLachlin 
C.J.). For detailed discussion see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: 
Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 301. 
10
  St. Catherine’s Milling, supra, note 6, at 54. 
11
  [1973] S.C.R. 313, at 328. See also Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, at 379-
82 (Dickson J.) [hereinafter “Guerin”]. 
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inal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive 
aboriginal cultures.”12 The Court clearly regarded this title as encom-
passing a beneficial right to natural resources such as timber, minerals, 
oil and gas, although access to those resources might be impeded by an 
inherent limit that prevents the lands from being used in ways that are 




This definition of Aboriginal title assists us in understanding the na-
ture of the provincial Crown’s underlying title to Aboriginal title lands 
that was acknowledged in St. Catherine’s Milling and affirmed in 
Delgamuukw. Although it was already apparent from St. Catherine’s 
Milling that for constitutional division-of-property and division-of-
powers reasons the provinces cannot take advantage of timber resources 
on lands that continue to be subject to Aboriginal title, we now know for 
sure from Delgamuukw that the beneficial interest in those resources is 
actually vested in the Aboriginal titleholders rather than in the Crown in 
right of the provinces. In other words, it is the Aboriginal titleholders, 
not the provinces, that own the natural resources, including timber, on 
their lands.
14
 Thus, the provinces cannot access those resources because, 
in addition to being prevented from doing so by exclusive federal juris-
diction over Aboriginal title, the provinces do not own the resources. In 
order to access them, the provinces therefore would first have to either 
acquire ownership of them (e.g., by a valid surrender of the Aboriginal 
title in a treaty negotiated with the federal Crown, as was held to have 
occurred in St. Catherine’s Milling), or have the authority to expropriate 
them from the Aboriginal titleholders (this would require constitutionally-
valid legislation).
15
 So for as long as Aboriginal title exists, the provinc-
                                                                                                                                
12
  Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 117 (Lamer C.J.). 
13
  For critical commentary on the inherent limit, see “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and 
Content of Aboriginal Title”, in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in 
Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 102, at 
116-22 [hereinafter “Emerging Justice?”]. 
14
  The word “own” is, I think, appropriate because the Supreme Court clearly regarded 
Aboriginal title and the right to natural resources encompassed by it as proprietary: see 
Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 113, and discussion in Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a 
Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000) 55, 
at 57-61 (also in Emerging Justice?, supra, note 13, 292, at 295-301). 
15
  The Crown does not have prerogative authority to expropriate property in peacetime, 
and so needs unequivocal legislative authority to do so: see discussion in McNeil, supra, note 9, at 
308-11; McNeil, supra, note 14, at 56-57 (Emerging Justice?, supra, note 13, at 293-95). 
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es’ underlying title clearly does not include entitlement to natural re-
sources on the lands that are subject to it. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the way Lamer C.J. dealt with the 
section 109 argument presented by British Columbia in Delgamuukw. In 
response to British Columbia’s contention that the underlying title to 
Aboriginal title lands conferred on the province by section 109 is a 
“right of ownership” that carries “with it the right to grant fee simples 
which, by implication, extinguish aboriginal title,” he said that this ar-
gument “fails to take account of the language of section 109,” which 
subjects provincial ownership to “any Interest other than that of the 
Province in the same.”16 This prevents the province from using section 
109 to extinguish Aboriginal title, a conclusion that is also consistent 
with exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands. The 
broader implication of this is obvious: section 109 not only limits pro-
vincial ownership to interests not encompassed by Aboriginal title, but 
together with section 91(24) prevents the Crown in right of the province 
from granting interests inconsistent with Aboriginal title. This is 
straightforward application of a fundamental common law maxim, 
namely nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what he or she does 
not have), combined with a division-of-powers restriction on provincial 
jurisdiction. 
In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. nonetheless said that the provinces can 
infringe Aboriginal title for purposes like forestry and mining develop-
ment, as long as the infringement can be justified under the Sparrow 
test,
17
 as elaborated on in R. v. Gladstone.
18
 From our discussion so far, 
it is evident that this authority to infringe cannot be found in section 109 
and the provincial Crown’s underlying title. That title co-exists with, 
and is subject to, Aboriginal title. It is a proprietary interest that is lim-
ited by another, pre-existing property interest that entails the right of 
exclusive occupation and use of the land and the natural resources on 
and under it.
19
 So if the provinces have the constitutional authority to 
infringe Aboriginal title, that authority must be jurisdictional rather than 
                                                                                                                                
16
  Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 175. 
17
  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. This test requires the Crown 
to prove it has a valid legislative objective for the infringement and has respected the fiduciary 
obligations it owes to the Aboriginal peoples. 
18
  [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter “Gladstone”]. 
19
  See Guerin, supra, note, 11, at 379; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 112-24. 
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proprietary in nature. But where in the Constitution is this jurisdictional 
authority to be found? 
Unfortunately, the Delgamuukw decision did not provide an answer 
to this question. One might suppose, however, that the principal sources 
of this provincial jurisdiction are located in section 92(13) (“Property 
and Civil Rights in the Province”) and section 92A (regarding non-
renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electrical energy).
20
 
As Aboriginal title is a property interest, at first glance it would appear 
to come within the scope of section 92(13). Natural resources on or 
under Aboriginal title lands would also appear to come within the gen-
eral scope of section 92A. But this is not an adequate answer because 
section 91(24) removes Aboriginal title lands and thus the resources that 
are part of them from section 92(13) and section 92A jurisdiction by 
conferring exclusive authority over them on Parliament.
21
 This prevents 
the provinces from enacting valid legislation in relation to “Lands re-
served for the Indians,” including Aboriginal title lands.22 Valid provin-
cial legislation of general application (that does not target Aboriginal 
lands) can nonetheless apply of its own force on lands so reserved,
23
 but 
not if it relates to possession or use of lands.
24
 This must mean that 
provincial jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title, if it exists at all, is 
very limited indeed.
25
 It must be restricted to provincial laws that are 
                                                                                                                                
20
  The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as amended by s. 50 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11. 
21
  Section 91(1A) likewise removes “The Public Debt and Property” from provincial juris-
diction by conferring exclusive authority over them on Parliament: see Kerry Wilkins, “Negative 
Capacity: Of Provinces and Lands Reserved for the Indians” (2002) 1 Indigenous L.J. 57, at 59-60. 
Note that most natural resources, such as minerals and growing timber, are presumed to be part of 
the land itself until physically separated from it.  
22
  See R. v. Dick, [1985] S.C.J. No. 62, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 55 [here-
inafter “Dick”]; Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] S.C.J. No. 16, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, [1986] 2 
C.N.L.R. 45 [hereinafter “Derrickson”]; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 173-76. 
23
  See Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 
1031 (labour relations); R. v. Francis, [1998] S.C.J. No. 43, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (traffic laws); 
Paul, supra, note 8, at para. 33 (jurisdiction of provincial tribunals). 
24
 Derrickson, supra, note 22; R. v. Isaac, [1975] N.S.J. No. 412, 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (C.A.); 
Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch Enterprises, [1970] B.C.J. No. 538, 74 W.W.R. 380 (C.A.). 
See discussion in Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal 
and Provincial Jurisdiction” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431, at 457-65 (also in Emerging Justice?, 
supra, note 13, 249, at 272-80). 
25
  For more detailed discussion, see Nigel Bankes, “Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and 
Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights” (1998) 32 
U.B.C.L. Rev. 317; Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185; 
McNeil, supra, note 24. 
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valid under a provincial head of power, but that are not sufficiently 
related to possession or use of land that they cross over into federal 
jurisdiction over Aboriginal title. It would therefore appear that the only 
provincial laws capable of infringing Aboriginal title without violating 
the constitutional division-of-powers would be provincial laws that are 




There is, however, a compelling argument against any provincial ju-
risdiction to infringe Aboriginal title, even incidentally. The 
Delgamuukw decision itself held that Aboriginal title, along with other 
Aboriginal rights, is within the core of federal jurisdiction over “Indians, 
and Lands reserved for the Indians,” and so is protected against extin-
guishment by provincial laws by the doctrine of interjurisdictional im-
munity.
27
 In reaching this conclusion, Lamer C.J. relied in part on Dick 
v. The Queen,
28
 where Beetz J. for a unanimous Court held that provin-
cial laws, even though of general application and otherwise constitu-
tionally valid, cannot apply ex proprio vigore (of their own force) to 
Indians if they impair Indian status or capacity or go to the core of 
Indianness.
29
 In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. related this core of Indianness 
to section 35 rights. After referring to Beetz J.’s observation that the 
core of Indianness encompasses activities “at the centre of what they 
[Indians] do and what they are,” the Chief Justice said: 
But in Van der Peet, I described and defined the aboriginal rights that 
are recognized and affirmed by s.35(1) in a similar fashion, as 
protecting the occupation of land and the activities which are integral 
to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right. It 
follows that aboriginal rights are part of the core of Indianness at the 
heart of s.91(24). Prior to 1982, as a result, they could not be 
extinguished by provincial laws of general application.
30
 
Although Lamer C.J. limited his holding in this regard to lack of 
provincial authority to extinguish Aboriginal title, his reliance on the 
Dick decision is significant. That case was not about the extinguishment, 
                                                                                                                                
26
  See Paul, supra, note 8, at paras. 14-16; Wilkins, supra, note 21. 
27
  Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 177-81. 
28
  Supra, note 22. 
29
  See also Paul, supra, note 8, at paras. 6, 16, 49. 
30
  Delgamuukw, supra, note 7 at para. 181, referring to Van der Peet, supra, note 8. See al-
so Paul, supra, note 7, at para. 33. 
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or indeed even the existence, of an Aboriginal right. Instead, it involved 
the application to a member of the Alkali Lake Band of Shuswap people 
of a British Columbia game law restricting hunting to open season. The 
Court held that if the game law impaired the Indianness of the appellant 
(which the Court assumed without deciding), then it “could not apply to 
the appellant ex proprio vigore, and, in order to preserve its constitu-
tionality, it would be necessary to read it down to prevent its applying to 
the appellant in the circumstances of this case.”31 The Court went on to 
decide that, on the assumption that the provincial law went to the core of 
Indianness, it would be referentially incorporated by section 88 of the 
Indian Act
32
 and so apply to the appellant as federal law. The Dick case 
is therefore authority for the general principle that any provincial law 
that impairs Indian status or capacity or that goes to the core of 
Indianness cannot apply to Indians of its own force because otherwise it 
would impinge on exclusive federal jurisdiction under section 91(24).
33
 
This is a division-of-powers principle that predates and thus does not 
depend on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
34
 Nor does its appli-
cation depend on occupation of the field and federal paramountcy 
(which were not involved in Dick). Rather, it is the direct result of the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, which prevents provincial laws 
from applying so as to affect the core of federal heads of power. 
The combined effect of the Dick and Delgamuukw decisions would 
thus appear to be as follows. Provincial laws, even laws of general ap-
plication that are not aimed at or do not single out section 91(24) “Indi-
ans,” cannot apply to them if they impair their status or capacity or go to 
the core of Indianness. To have this unconstitutional impact, the provin-
cial laws in question would not even have to infringe, let alone extin-
guish, an Aboriginal right.
35
 However, given that Aboriginal rights 
generally, and Aboriginal title in particular, are “part of the core of 
                                                                                                                                
31
  Dick, supra, note 22, at 23. 
32
  R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6, now R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
33
  See also R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.J. No. 400, [2004] 2 C.N.L.R. 219 (C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Morris”], leave to appeal granted by the S.C.C. November 12, 2004. 
34
  This was expressly acknowledged by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw: see the quotation ac-
companying note 30, compare notes 44, 48-50, below. 
35
  See also Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751; 
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R 146, at paras. 74-78. 
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Indianness at the heart of section 91(24),”36 any provincial laws that 
infringe those rights would necessarily go to the core of Indianness and 
so could not apply of their own force. If those laws are to apply to Indi-
ans, they can only do so by referential incorporation into federal law.
37
 
How then is one to explain Lamer C.J.’s assertion in Delgamuukw 
that “[t]he aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1), includ-
ing Aboriginal title, … may be infringed, both by federal (e.g., Sparrow 
[supra, note 17]) and provincial (e.g., Côté, [infra, note 39]) govern-
ments”?38 This statement certainly suggests that provincial laws can 
infringe those rights of their own force, not just through referential in-
corporation into federal law. Looking at R. v. Côté,
39
 the authority he 
relied upon for provincial authority to infringe, two things should be 
noted. First, no actual provincial infringement of an Aboriginal right by 
provincial law occurred in that case, as the Supreme Court held that the 
law in question facilitated rather than restricted the Aboriginal right.
40
 It 
was therefore unnecessary for the Court to decide that the provinces 
have the constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal rights.
41
 More 
importantly, the Court apparently decided this vital constitutional issue 
without mentioning the Dick decision, without explicit acknowledge-
ment of the relevance of section 91(24), and without discussion of the 
division-of-powers issue or the applicability of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity. Justice Lamer, in a judgment concurred in 
by the other members of the Court,
42
 simply said this: 
In Sparrow, the Court set out the applicable framework for identifying 
the infringement of an aboriginal right or treaty right under s.35(1) of 
                                                                                                                                
36
  Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 181 (see quotation accompanying note 30 above). 
37
  See R. v. Alphonse, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1402, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 19 (C.A.); Morris, su-
pra, note 33. Although space does not allow me to go into the matter at this time, it needs to be said 
that referential incorporation by s. 88 of the Indian Act of provincial laws that infringe Aboriginal 
rights, especially Aboriginal title, is also problematic: see Kerry Wilkins, “‘Still Crazy After All 
These Years’: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458; Kent McNeil, 
“Aboriginal Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act” (2000) 34 U.B.C.L. Rev. 159. 
38
  Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 160. See also Paul, supra, note 8, at paras. 10, 24-25. 
39
  [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter “Côté”]. 
40
  Id., at para. 80. 
41
  See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2002] B.C.J. No. 1882, 
[2002] 4 C.N.L.R. 117, at paras. 77-78 (Lambert J.A.), reversed in part by Haida Nation, supra, 
note 1, without reference to this aspect of Côté. 
42
  Justice La Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote short concurring judgments, without re-
ferring to provincial authority to infringe. 
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the Constitution Act, 1982. It should be noted that the test in Sparrow 
was originally elucidated in the context of a federal regulation which 
allegedly infringed an aboriginal right. The majority of recent cases 
which have subsequently invoked the Sparrow framework have 
similarly done so against the backdrop of a federal statute or 
regulation. See, e.g., Gladstone [supra, note 18]. But it is quite clear 
that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is alleged to have 
infringed an aboriginal or treaty right in a manner which cannot be 
justified: Badger [infra, note 45], at para. 85 (application of Sparrow 
test to provincial statute which violated a treaty right). The text and 
purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial 
laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be 
subject to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny.
43
 
With all due respect, before deciding whether the Sparrow justifica-
tion test applies in the context of provincial legislation, the Court in 
Côté should have addressed the issue of whether the provinces even 
have the constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal rights, given 
section 91(24) and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Had the 
Court done so and taken the Dick case into consideration, I think the 
answer would have had to be that the provinces generally do not have 
this authority.
44
 R. v. Badger,
45
 the case relied upon by Lamer C.J. in 
this context, does not support any general provincial authority to in-
fringe Aboriginal or treaty rights because it involved the application of 
the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements,
46
 which gave the three 
Prairie Provinces explicit constitutional authority in relation to Indian 
hunting, trapping and fishing. That was the context in which provincial 
infringement of a treaty right to hunt was considered in that case. But 
given the absence of an equivalent grant of constitutional authority to 
Quebec (where Côté arose) and the other provinces, instead of relying 
on Badger, the Court in Côté should have undertaken the kind of divi-
sion-of-powers analysis engaged in in Dick. 
The contradictions arising from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
in relation to this matter can be demonstrated by a hypothetical example. 
                                                                                                                                
43
  Côté, supra, note 39, at para. 74. 
44
  As discussed above, this follows from the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw, supra, note 
7, that Aboriginal rights are within the core of federal jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands re-
served for the Indians”: see text accompanying notes 30-37. 
45
  [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter “Badger”]. 
46
  Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21 George V., c. 26 (U.K.), Schs. (1)-(3). 
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Suppose a First Nation in British Columbia has a special attachment to a 
specific site that has spiritual significance for them. The province issues 
a licence to a forestry company authorizing it to log the site. The First 
Nation proves either a site-specific Aboriginal right in relation to the 
site or Aboriginal title to the land on which the site is located, and 
shows how the licence will infringe the right or title. Even though this 
right or title would be constitutionally protected by section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, according to Côté and Delgamuukw the province 
could still justify the infringement if it met the justification test. Alterna-
tively, without even establishing an Aboriginal right or title, the First 
Nation proves that the site is important enough to them that it comes 
within the core of their Indianness, or that the logging would impair 
their status or capacity. Following the unanimous decision of the Su-
preme Court in the Dick case, the provincial law under which the li-
cence had been issued could not apply of its own force in these 
circumstances because it would impinge upon exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” No justification 
of the provincial law could make it apply so as to affect the First Na-
tion’s Indianness. So, the division-of-powers approach clearly provides 
greater protection to the site than does section 35(1), even in the absence 
of proof of an Aboriginal right or title.
47
 Moreover, if an Aboriginal 
right or title is proven, then, according to Delgamuukw, that brings the 
matter within the core of federal jurisdiction, which, according to Dick, 
must exclude the application of provincial laws ex proprio vigore. So 
how can the province have jurisdiction to infringe? 
Let us now return to the Haida Nation case. Because no Aboriginal 
title or other Aboriginal right has yet been established by the Haida 
Nation in relation to the lands in question on Haida Gwaii (the Queen 
Charlotte Islands), it is premature to say that there is an infringement 
that the province must justify. The fundamental, unresolved dispute 
between the Haida Nation and British Columbia is nonetheless over title 
to the land, including the timber growing on it. Looking again at section 
                                                                                                                                
47
  In Côté, supra, note 39, at para. 87, Lamer C.J. recognized this in the context of a treaty 
right and s. 88 of the Indian Act, supra, note 32, and appeared to be somewhat puzzled by it. See 
also R. v. Sundown, [1990] S.C.J. No. 13, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, at para. 48 (Cory J.). In my respect-
ful opinion, the puzzlement arises from a failure to appreciate the fundamental difference between 
division-of-powers and s. 35(1) protection for Aboriginal and treaty rights. It should not be surpris-
ing that there is no room for justifiable infringement in situations where a province is violating 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
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109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, if the Haida Nation does eventually 
establish its Aboriginal title it will have an interest other than that of the 
province that will exclude the timber and other natural resources from 
provincial ownership.
48
 In that event, the province will not be able to 
rely on a proprietary right as the basis of its authority to infringe the 
Aboriginal title. Instead, it will have to rely on jurisdictional authority, 
primarily arising from section 92 and section 92A of the 1867 Act.
49
 But 
we have already seen that, given exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
Aboriginal title under section 91(24), provincial jurisdiction to infringe 




Let us assume, however, that the province does have jurisdiction to 
infringe Aboriginal title to some extent by enacting statutes of general 
application. The British Columbia statute authorizing the province to 
grant the Tree Farm Licence (TFL) that the Haida contend infringes 
their Aboriginal title is the Forest Act.
51
 That Act authorizes the grant-
ing of TFLs and other kinds of licences “to harvest Crown timber.”52 
“Crown timber” is defined as “timber on Crown land, or timber reserved 
to the government.”53 “‘Crown land’ has the same meaning as in the 
Land Act,”54 i.e., “land, whether or not it is covered by water, or an 
interest in land, vested in the government.”55 The province seems to 
assume that land subject to Aboriginal title comes within this definition 
of “Crown land.” We know, however, from St. Catherine’s Milling, 
Delgamuukw, and now Haida Nation that section 109 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867, subjects provincial ownership to Aboriginal title. We 
also know from Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title includes the right to 
exclusive possession and that it encompasses timber and other natural 
resources. Thus, for constitutional reasons “Crown land” that is subject 
to Aboriginal title must be limited to the provincial Crown’s underlying 
title. It cannot include a right of possession, nor can it include ownership 
of natural resources such as timber. Accordingly, the Forest Act does 
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  See text accompanying notes 5-16, supra. 
49
  See text accompanying notes 20-21, supra. 
50
  See text accompanying notes 20-37, supra. 
51
  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157. 
52
  Id., s.12. 
53
  Id., s. 1(1). 
54
  Id. 
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  Land Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 245, s. 1. 
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For British Columbia to be able to authorize the taking of timber 
from Aboriginal title lands, it would need statutory authority beyond 
that provided by the Forest Act. What that Act does is provide authority 
for the granting of licences to harvest Crown timber on Crown land. To 
authorize the harvesting of Aboriginal timber on Aboriginal title land, 
the province would have to enact legislation in the nature of an expro-
priation statute. The legislation could not be aimed at Aboriginal title 
land, as that would violate section 91(24) and make the statute ultra 
vires.
57
 It would have to be a law of general application, permitting the 
province to authorize the taking of timber from any lands, whether pri-
vately-held or subject to Aboriginal title. One can imagine the political 
storm such legislation would provoke among private landowners in the 
province, let alone First Nations. Moreover, if the legislation was used 
exclusively or even primarily to authorize forestry operations on Abo-
riginal title lands, a court might hold that, despite being of general ap-
plication on its face, it was really a colourable attempt to single out 




                                                                                                                                
56
  Insofar as s. 109 is concerned, the Aboriginal interest should be no different than any 
other interest by which provincial ownership of land is limited. Would anyone seriously argue that 
the province could rely on s. 109 and the Forest Act, supra, note 51, to authorize the granting of 
TFLs in relation to privately-held lands, even though the province holds an underlying title to those 
lands as well? 
57
  See Derrickson, supra, note 22; Dick, supra, note 22; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at pa-
ra. 179. 
58
  Provincial singling out can be either overt or colourable in this context: Dick, supra, 
note 22, at 25, relying on R. v. Kruger, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; see also Morris, supra, note 33, at 
para. 118 (Thackray J.A.). It also needs to be emphasized that the scenario presented in the above 
paragraph is premised on the assumption (which I do not accept) that the province can infringe 
Aboriginal title if the infringement can be justified. In my opinion one has to question how expro-
priation legislation of this sort, even if of general application, can apply to Aboriginal title lands 
without impinging upon the core of exclusive federal jurisdiction that is supposed to be protected 
by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Surely the legislation, if used to authorize forestry 
operations on Aboriginal title lands, would impair the First Nation right of possession that was said 
by Chouinard J. in Derrickson, supra, note 22, at 44, to be “manifestly of the very essence of the 
federal exclusive legislative power under subs. 91(24).” See also Paul v. Paul, [1986] S.C.J. No. 
19, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306. Although Derrickson and Paul both involved Indian reserves rather than 
Aboriginal title lands, the Aboriginal interest in each is fundamentally similar and both are under 
exclusive s. 91(24) jurisdiction: Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] S.C.J. No. 82, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 746, at para. 41; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 120, 174-76. 
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In my opinion, the reason British Columbia is able to rely on the 
Forest Act to grant TFLs on Haida Gwaii is that the Aboriginal title of 
the Haida has not yet been established, and so for the time being the 
province is able to claim that the lands in question are Crown lands 
within the statutory definition. But if Aboriginal title to those lands is 
established, they will fall outside the statutory definition and so the 
provincial authority will disappear. This will mean that the original 
grant of the TFL and its transfer to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited 
would have lacked statutory authority and therefore would have been 
unlawful from the outset. This could render both the province and 
Weyerhaeuser liable for wrongful intrusion onto the Haida Nation’s 
lands.
59
 For this reason, I think it is essential for the province not only to 
consult with the Haida Nation, as the Supreme Court has decided it 
must, but also to come to an agreement with them in relation to the 
forestry resources on Haida Gwaii, prudently with federal participation 
as a party.
60
 Although McLachlin C.J. said that the duty to consult does 
not include a “duty to agree,”61 in my opinion that conclusion applies 
only so long as the Haida’s Aboriginal title has not been proven. So if 
the province wants to avoid liability in the future for unlawful interfer-
ence with the Haida’s title once proven, it had better do more than con-
sult. Given the strength of the Haida’s title claim, I think it would be 
wise for the province to proceed on the assumption that the title will be 
established, rather than risk the embarrassment and cost of being found 
in court to have given Weyerhaeuser the unlawful go-ahead to trespass 
on Haida lands. 
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  On the availability of an action in trespass to defend possession of Aboriginal title lands, 
see Kent McNeil, “The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775, at 
796-800 (also in Emerging Justice?, supra, note 13, 136, at 154-58). On liability of provincial 
officials for trespass on those lands, see Wilkins, supra, note 21, at 97-100. 
60
  The reason why it would be prudent for the federal government to be a party to any such 
agreement is that Aboriginal title is inalienable, other than by surrender to the Crown in right of 
Canada: Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 113, 173-75. On the other hand, I am not aware of 
any case law holding that Aboriginal peoples cannot, in the absence of federal participation, create 
third party interests in their Aboriginal title lands, or alienate natural resources on or under those 
lands to a province, as long as their Aboriginal title is retained: see discussion in Kent McNeil, 
“Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 473, esp. at 
502-508. 
61
  Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
